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Abstract:
Purpose: Dual-channels have been widely used in practice, and the pricing decisions and the
online channel operation mode choice have been the core problems in dual-channel supply
chain management. This paper focuses on the online channel operation mode choice from the
supply chain power structures based on game theoretical analysis.
Design/methodology/approach: This paper utilizes three kinds of  game theoretical models
to analyze  the  impact  of  supply  chain power structures on the  optimal  pricing  and online
channel operation mode choice.
Findings: Results derived in this paper indicate that when the self-price elasticity is large, the
power structures have no direct impact on the decisions. However, when the self-price elasticity
is small and customers’ preference for the online channel is low, then in the MS market, it is
better  for the retailer  to operate the online channel,  while  in the RS market or in the VN
market, it is better for the manufacturer to operate the online channel.
Research limitations/implications: In this paper, we do not consider stochastic demand and
asymmetric information, which may not well suit the reality.
Originality/value: This paper provides a different perspective to analyze the impact of  supply
chain power structures on the pricing decisions and online channel operation mode choice. The
comparison of  these two online channel operation modes in this paper is also a unique point.
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1. Introduction
The past two decades has witnessed the popularity of the online electronic channels. Now more
and  more  customers are  accustomed  to  purchasing  products  online, which  induces an
increasing number of  retailers or manufacturers to introduce the online channels into their
traditional marketing channels. It is reported that on November 11th, 2014, the trade volume
of Tmall.com, a platform for local Chinese and international businesses to sell brand name
goods to consumers, is up to 35 billion Yuan. The convenience of online payment and prompt
logistics  distribution  jointly  contribute to  the  popularity online  channels.  Through online
channels, firms can  process  customers’ orders, control the distribution and pricing of goods,
have a greater understanding of customers’ preference (Mukhopadhyay, Zhu & Yue, 2008). It
is reported that about 42% of the top suppliers such as IBM, Nike, Pioneer Electronics, Estee
Lauder, and Dell, are selling to customers through online channels (Chiang, Chhajed & Hess,
2003; Tsay & Agrawal, 2004).
Though the importance of introducing online channels has been widely recognized, which party
should operate the online channels is not very clear. In practice, some manufacturers choose to
open online channels of their own, while others mainly rely on their  downstream retailers to
operate the online channels. For example, Suning, one of the largest appliance retailers in
China, sells the appliance both through the bricks and mortar and online channel. While Dell,
one of the largest computer manufacturers in the world, operates both the retail channel and
the  online  channel.  A  natural  question  emerges  as  for  why  different  supply  chains  have
different  online  channel  operation  modes?  What  factors  impact  the  supply  chain’s  online
channel operation mode choice?
To  answer  these  questions,  we  consider  a  two-echelon  supply  chain  composed of  one
manufacturer  and  one  retailer. Suppose  that  the  supply  chain  is  now  considering
introducing  the online  electronic  channel. We consider three  different supply chain power
structures.  In  the  manufacturer  dominant  market,  the  manufacturer  acts  as  the
Stackelberg  leader  and  the  retailer  the follower.  In  the  retailer  dominant  market,  the
retailer moves first as the Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer follows as the follower.
If the manufacturer and the retailer have identical power, they move simultaneously. We
compare the total  profits of the supply chain under two different online channel operation
modes: the manufacturer operating the online channel  versus the retailer  operating the
online channel, under these three different supply chain power structures. We find that the
online channel operation mode  choice  is  jointly  affected by customers’ preference for the
online channel, the self-price elasticity and the supply chain power structures. When the
self-price elasticity is large, power structures have no direct impact on the online channel
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mode choice. However, when the self-price elasticity is small and customers’ preference for
the online channel is low, in the MS market, it is better for the retailer to operate the online
channel, while in the RS and VN markets, it is better for the manufacturer to operate the
online channel.
This  paper  falls  into  the  dual-channel  supply  chain  management.  The  channel  structure
composed of both the traditional offline retail  channel and the online electronic channel is
called the dual-channel. When the manufacturer opens the online channel, this phenomenon is
called manufacturer encroachment (Arya, Mittendorf & Sappington, 2007; Li, Gilbert & Lai,
2013, 2015; Li, Xie & Zhao, 2015). The manufacturer encroachment may cause severe channel
conflict, because the manufacturer becomes the competitor of the downstream retailer. Some
literature on dual-channel supply chain management focuses on the coordination mechanism
to alleviate the potential channel conflict. Tsay and Agrawal (2004) study the channel conflict
and coordination between the manufacturer and the retailer in a dual-channel supply chain.
Mukhopadhyay et al. (2008) provides a way to alleviate the channel conflict when the retailer
is able to add value to the product. Yan (2008) investigates the strategic role of profit sharing
and finds that both parties will benefit from a dual-channel profit sharing strategy. Chiang et
al.  (2003)  and  Chen,  Kaya  and  Özer  (2008)  study  the  pricing  decisions  between  a
manufacturer and a retailer in a dual-channel supply chain based on consumer choice behavior.
Cai (2010) studies the influence of channel structures and pricing schemes on the dual-channel
supply  chain.  Chen,  Zhang  and  Sun  (2012),  Xu,  Dan,  Zhang  and  Liu  (2014),  study  the
coordination contract design in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain.
Some literature introduces other decision variables into the dual-channel supply chain. Hua,
Wang  and  Chen  (2010)  and  Xu,  Liu  and  Zhang  (2012)  study  the  pricing  and  lead  time
decisions in a dual-channel supply chain. Dan, Xu and Liu (2012) study the pricing and retail
service decisions in a dual-channel supply chain. Huang, Yang and Zhang (2012) and Huang,
Yang and Liu (2013) study the pricing and production decisions in a dual-channel supply chain
when  the  supply  chain  experiences  demand  disruption  and  production  cost  disruption,
respectively. Zhang, Xiong and Xiong (2015) study the coordination issue when a dual-channel
supply chain experiences demand disruption or production cost disruption. Cao (2014) and
Cao,  Zhou  and  Lϋ  (2015)  study  the  channel  coordination  after  demand  disruption  and
production cost disruption. Cao, Ma, Wan and Lai (2013) study the contract design problem in
a dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric cost information. 
This paper is mostly related to the literature in dual-channel supply chain management when
considering different supply chain power structures. Zhang, Liu and Wang (2012) study the
effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on the optimal pricing decisions
under different supply chain power structures. In their model, the online channel is operated
by the manufacturer. Chen, Wang and Jiang (2015) investigate the impact of supply chain
power structure on the O2O mixed dual-channel, where the retailer operates both the offline
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retail  channel  and the online electronic  channel.  Wang, Niu and Guo (2013) investigate  a
supply  chain comprising an original  equipment  manufacturer  and a contract  manufacturer,
where the contract manufacturer acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to
the  original  equipment  manufacturer.  The  two  parties  engage  in  one  of  three  Cournot
competition games:  a simultaneous game,  a sequential  game with the original  equipment
manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the contract manufacturer
as the Stackelberg leader.  Based on these three games,  they investigate  the two parties’
Stackelberg  leadership/followership  decisions.  Though  there  are  already  some  literature
addressing the pricing decisions under different supply chain power structures, there is little
research on which supply chain party should operate the online channel. Because the online
channel operation mode choice will affect the supply chain’s optimal pricing decisions, which
will eventually impact the optimal profits for different parties, it is necessary to incorporate the
supply chain power structures into the supply chain’s optimal online channel operation mode
choice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3
analyzes the scenario of the manufacturer Stackelberg market. Section 4 analyzes the scenario
of the retailer Stackelberg market. In section 5, the scenario of the vertical Nash market is
analyzed. In the three different market structures, we derive the supply chain’s optimal pricing
decisions and the profits for different supply chain parties. At last, we compare the supplier
chain’s profits under two different online channel operation modes under different supply chain
power structures. Section 6 summarizes the results.
2. Model Setup
Consider a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. There are two selling
channels, one is the traditional offline retail channel, and the other is the online electronic
channel.  In  the offline  retail  channel,  the manufacturer sells the product to the retailer at
wholesale price  w,  who then serves the end customers at offline retail price  pr.  In the online
channel,  we consider two kinds of  online channel  operation modes. In the first mode, the
manufacturer  operates the online channel  and sells  products  directly  to  end customers  at
online retail price  pe, which is depicted in Figure 1. This channel structure is also called  the
traditional  dual-channel  in  operations  management  literature (Hua  et  al.,  2010).  The
manufacturer simultaneously determines the wholesale price  w and the  online retail price  pe,
and the retailer determines the offline retail price pr. 
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Figure 1. Manufacturer operates the online channel
In  the  second  mode,  the  retailer  operates  the  online  channel  and  serves  end  customers
through both  the  offline channel and  the  online channel, which is depicted in Figure 2. This
channel structure is also called  the  online-to-offline dual-channel in operations management
literature (Chen et al., 2015). As more and more giant retailers choose to open online channels
to sell products, this dual-channel structure is also very popular in practice. The manufacturer
should determine the wholesale price w, and the retailer should simultaneously determine the
offline retail price pr and the online retail price pe. For analytical simplicity, following Arya et al.
(2007) and Zhang et al. (2012), we normalize the unit production cost for the manufacturer
and the selling cost to zeros.
Figure 2. Retailer operates the online channel (Chen, Wang and Jiang, 2015)
For model simplicity, we assume that the demands in the two channels are linear in self-price
and  cross-price  elasticity.  This  assumption  is  very  common  in  operations  management
literature  (Raju  &  Abhik,  2000;  Yue  & Liu,  2006;  Kurata, Yao &  Liu,  2007;  Huang  &
Swaminathan, 2009; Hua et al., 2010;  Huang et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013; Chen et al.,
2015).  We  further  assume  that  the  self-price  elasticity  and  the  cross-price  elasticity  are
symmetric (Zhang et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2015). 
The demand in the two channels, the offline channel and the online channel, are given by the
following equations
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(1)
(2)
where  the  subscript  r and  e denote  the  offline  retail  channel  and  the  online  electronic
channel,  respectively.  The  demand  functions  in  Equations  (1)  and  (2)  indicate  that  the
demands in the two channels both depend on the offline retail price pr and the online retail
price  pe.  The  parameter   represents  the  base  market  demand  level.  The  parameter  
captures customers’ preference for the online channel. The larger  is, the more intense the
channel conflict is (Hua et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012). The parameter  is the coefficient
of the self-price elasticity of its own channel, and the parameter   is the coefficient of the
cross-price elasticity of the opposite channel. Assume  > , so the price elasticity of the own
channel is greater than the cross-price elasticity of the opposite channel  (Hua et al., 2010;
Huang et al., 2012). 
We  consider  three  different  supply  chain  power  structure  models,  i.e.,  the  manufacturer
Stackelberg  model,  the  retailer  Stackelberg  model  and  the  vertical  Nash  model.  In  the
manufacturer Stackelberg  model,  the  manufacturer  moves  first  acting  as  the  Stackelberg
leader  and  then  the  retailer  follows acting  as  the  Stackelberg  follower.  In  the  retailer
Stackelberg,  the  retailer  moves  first  acting  as  the  Stackelberg  leader  and  then  the
manufacturer follows acting as the Stackelberg follower. In the vertical Nash model, both the
manufacturer and the retailer move simultaneously. In the three different supply chain power
structures, we consider two types of online channel operation modes, i.e., the manufacturer
operating the online channel versus the retailer operating the online channel.  Under these
three different supply chain power structures, we concentrate on the analysis of the optimal
pricing, as well as the comparison of the supply chain’s performance,  under the two online
channel operation modes.
Our analysis is mostly related to Chen, Wang and Jiang (2015) and Huang, Yang and Zhang
(2012), but with a different motivation. We would like to compare the performance of the two
online channel operation modes and study which mode is superior. In order to make the paper
self-contained, we use some results from Chen, Wang and Jiang (2015) and Huang, Yang and
Zhang (2012) as the references. We list their results as lemmas throughout the paper.
3. Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) Model
In this section,  we consider the manufacturer Stackelberg market. In the MS market,  the
manufacturer  acts  as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer  the Stackelberg follower.  We
consider two types of online channel operation modes, respectively. 
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3.1. The Manufacturer Operating the Online Channel
The sequence of the events is as follows:
(1) The manufacturer first announces the wholesale price w and the online retail price pe;
(2) The retailer then announces the offline retail price  pr given the manufacturer’s pricing
decisions;
(3) Finally,  customer  demand is  resolved  and  the  profits  are  realized  according  to  the
announced prices.
In the MS market with the manufacturer operating the online channel,  the retailer’s  profit
maximization problem is determined by
(3)
and the manufacturer’s profit function is determined by
(4)
where the subscript R and M denotes the retailer and manufacturer, respectively, throughout
the paper. We solve this problem by backward induction. First, given the wholesale price w and
online  retail  price  pe determined  by  the  manufacturer,  we  obtain  the  retailer’s  optimal
responsive pricing decision, and then we solve the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price  w
and online retail price pe.
The following lemma, which is presented in Huang, Yang and Zhang (2012), characterizes the
optimal pricing decisions and profits in the MS market with the manufacturer operating the
online channel.
Lemma 1 (Huang, Yang and Zhang, 2012). In the MS decentralized dual-channel supply
chain with the manufacturer operating the online channel, the optimal pricing decisions are:
(5)
And the supply chain’s optimal profit is
(6)
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3.2. The Retailer Operating the Online Channel 
The sequence of the events is as follows:
(1) The manufacturer first announces the wholesale price w;
(2) The retailer then announces the offline retail price pr and the online retail price pe, given
the manufacturer’s pricing decisions;
(3) Finally,  customer  demand is  resolved  and  the  profits  are  realized  according  to  the
announced prices.
In the MS market with the retailer operating the online channel, the retailer’s profit function is
determined by
(7)
where the first term is the retailer’s profit from the offline channel and the second term is the
profit from the online channel. 
And the manufacturer’s profit function is determined by
(8)
The following lemma, presented in Chen, Wang and Jiang (2015), characterizes the optimal
pricing decisions in the MS market with the retailer operating the online channel.
Lemma 2 (Chen, Wang and Jiang, 2015). In the MS decentralized dual-channel supply
chain with the retailer operating the online channel, the optimal pricing decisions are:
(9)
And the supply chain’s optimal profit is
(10)
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3.3. Comparison Analysis
The  above  two  subsections  analyze  the  optimal  pricing  decisions  and  the  supply  chain
performances for the two online channel operation modes, respectively. In subsequent, we
would like to analyze, from the perspective of the supply chain, which online channel operation
mode is more efficient in the MS market. The following proposition characterizes the result.
Proposition 1. If , then , otherwise, .
Proof. From the results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have
(11)
If  the  customers’ preference  for  the  online  channel  satisfy  ,  then
, otherwise, . Thus, the results can be easily obtained.
The following corollary characterizes the impact of customers’ preference on the online channel
on the supply chain’s optimal pricing decisions.
Corollary 1. (1)  ;  (2)   if  and only if   ≥  1/2;  (3)   if  and only if
.
Proof. Comparing the results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have: (1) ;
(2) , which is nonnegative if an only if  ≥ 1/2; (3) ,
then the results can be easily obtained. 
Proposition 1 indicates that, in the MS market, if customers’ preference for the online channel
is  low, then from the perspective of the supply chain, it  is  better for the manufacturer to
operate the online channel. Otherwise, it is better for the retailer to operate the online channel.
The intuition is  as follows.  When customers’  preference for  the online channel  is  low, the
retailer  knows  more  about  customers’  channel  preference  and  is  in  an  ideal  position  to
introduce  the  online  channel  to  the  customers.  For  example,  when  a  customer  goes  into
Suning Appliance to buy a refrigerator, obviously, he may not know the  possibility  of buying
appliances  online  or  just  prefer  to  buy  on  spot.  In  order  to  encourage  the  customer  to
purchase online at suning.com, Suning offers customers coupons which can be used for other
future orders made online at suning.com. In other words, retailers can make full use of the
advantage  of  contacting  customers  to  introduce  the  online  channel.  When  customers’
preference for the online channel is high, the manufacturer should operates the online channel,
this is because from Corollary 1 we know that, when  is large, , which means that the
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optimal online retail price under manufacturer operating the online channel is smaller than that
under retailer operating  the  online channel.  It is better for the manufacturer to operate the
online channel.
4. Retailer Stackelberg (RS) Model
In this section, we analyze the retailer Stackelberg market. In the RS market, the retailer acts
as the Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg follower. Similar to
Section 3, we analyze the optimal pricing decisions and supply chain performance under two
decision modes.
4.1. The Manufacturer Operating the Online Channel
The sequence of the evens is as follows:
(1) The retailer first announces the offline retailer price pr;
(2) The manufacturer then announces the online retail price pe and the wholesale price w,
given the retailer’s pricing decision;
(3) Finally,  customer  demand is  resolved  and  the  profits  are  realized  according  to  the
announced prices.
Following Zhang et al. (2012) and Chen et al., 2015, we assume the marginal profit for the
offline channel is  mr = pr – w. In the RS market with the manufacturer operating the online
channel, the manufacturer’s profit, denoted by , is
(12)
In Equation (12), the first term is the profit from the offline channel, and the second term is
the profit from the online channel. The retailer’s profit, denoted by , is
(13)
The following proposition  characterizes the optimal  pricing decisions  and profits  in  the RS
market with the manufacturer operating the online channel.
Proposition  2. In  the  RS decentralized dual-channel  supply  chain  with  the  manufacturer
operating the online channel, the optimal pricing decisions are: 
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(14)
And the supply chain’s optimal profit is
(15)
Proof. Taking the first-order and second-order derivatives of  with respect to w and pe,
respectively, we obtain
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
It  is  easy  to  verify  that   is  jointly  concave  in  w and  pe.  Let   and
,  we  get   and  .  Then  the  retailer’s  decision
problem can be rewritten as
(20)
Since  , which indicates that   is concave in  pr, then from the first-
order  condition  ,  we  get  .  Substituting  it  into
, we obtain wRS.
4.2. The Retailer Operating the Online Channel
The sequence of the events is as follows:
(1) The retailer first announces offline retail price pr and the online retail price pe;
(2) The manufacturer then announces the wholesale price  w,  given the retailer’s pricing
decisions;
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(3) Finally,  customer  demand is  resolved  and  the  profits  are  realized  according  to  the
announced prices.
The  following  proposition,  presented  in  Chen,  Wang  and  Jiang  (2015),  characterizes  the
optimal pricing decisions in the RS market with the retailer operating the online channel.
Lemma 3 (Chen, Wang and Jiang, 2015).  In the RS decentralized dual-channel supply
chain with the retailer operating the online channel, the optimal pricing decisions are: 
(21)
And the supply chain’s optimal profit is
(22)
4.3. Comparison Analysis
We next compare the supply chain’s profit under these two online channel operation modes in
the RS market. The following proposition characterizes the result.
Proposition 3. (1) If  b <  a ≤ 2b, then  ; (2) If  a ≥ 2b, then   if and only if
.
Proof. From the results in Lemma 3 and Proposition 2, we have
(23)
Let , which is quadratic and convex in   (0,1) and minimized when   1.
Thus, we can obtain the results by analyzing the property of the function of  H() in three
different cases. 
Proposition  3  indicates  that  when  the  self-price  elasticity  is  small,  it  is  better  for  the
manufacturer to operate the online channel. However, when the self-price elasticity is large,
then if customers’ preference for the online channel is low, it is better for the retailer to
operate  the  online  channel,  otherwise,  it  is  better  for  the  manufacturer  to  operate  the
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online channel. The intuition is  as follows. Since the  self-price elasticity is  not too large
compared with the cross-price elasticity, which means that the channel substitution is high,
in this case, the retailer will take mild actions to cope with the introduction of the online
channel. If the retailer operates the online channel, the impact of channel encroachment
will  has  more  direct  adverse  impact  on  the  retailer’s  profit.  Thus,  the  manufacturer
operating the online channel will be beneficial to both parties. However, when the sell-price
elasticity  is  large,  this  means  that  the  channel  substitution  is  low.  In  this  case,  if
customers’ preference for the online channel is low, then the retailer can make full use of
her advantage of contacting customers to introduce the online channel, which will make the
online channel more profitable. If the manufacturer operates the online channel, then the
recognition degree of the online channel will  be  low and the online channel  will  be not
efficient enough. On the contrary, if customers’ preference for the online channel is high,
then  the  manufacturer  should  operate  the  online  channel  because  he  has  the  cost
advantage. 
5. Vertical Nash (VN) Model
In subsequent, we would like to analyze the vertical Nash market. In the VN market, the
manufacturer and the retailer are in identical power position.  They move simultaneously to
maximize their individual profits without knowing the other party’s pricing decisions. Similarly,
we analyze the optimal pricing decisions and supply chain performance under two decision
modes.
5.1. The Manufacturer Operating the Online Channel
The sequence of the evens is as follows:
(1) The  retailer  announces  the  offline  retailer  price  pr,  meanwhile,  the  manufacturer
announces the wholesale price w and the online retail price pe;
(2) Then  customer  demand  is  resolved  and  the  profits  are  realized  according  to  the
announced prices.
Assume that the marginal profit for the offline channel is mr = pr – w. In the VN market with the
manufacturer operating the online channel, the manufacturer’s profit, denoted by , is
(24)
where the first term is the profit from the offline channel, and the second term is the profit
from the online channel. 
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And the retailer’s profit, denoted by , is 
(25)
The following proposition  characterizes the optimal  pricing decisions and profits  in  the VN
market with the manufacturer operating the online channel.
Proposition  4. In  the  VN decentralized  dual-channel  supply  chain  with  the  manufacturer
operating the online channel, the optimal pricing decisions are: 
(26)
And the supply chain’s optimal profit is
(27)
Proof. From Equation (24), we have
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
It can be verified that  is jointly concave in w and pe. Let  and ,
we obtain   and  , which  jointly  reduces to  . Let
, we get , thus, we can obtain wVN and  .
5.2. The Retailer Operating the Online Channel
The sequence of the events is as follows:
(1) The  retailer  announces  the  offline  retailer  price  pr and  the  online  retail  price  pe,
meanwhile, the manufacturer announces the wholesale price w;
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(2) Then  customer  demand  is  resolved  and  the  profits  are  realized  according  to  the
announced prices.
The following lemma, presented in Chen, Wang and Jiang (2015), characterizes the optimal
pricing decisions in the VN market with the retailer operating the online channel.
Lemma 5 (Chen, Wang and Jiang, 2015).  In the VN decentralized dual-channel supply
chain with the retailer operating the online channel, the optimal pricing decisions are:
(32)
And the supply chain’s optimal profit is
(33)
5.3. Comparison Analysis
We next compare the supply chain’s profits under these two online channel operation modes in
the VN market. The following proposition characterizes the result.
Proposition 5. (1)  If  b <  a ≤ 2b, then  ; (2) If  a > 2b, then   if and only if
.
Proof. From the results in Proposition 4 and Lemma 5, we have
(34)
Let , which is quadratic in   (0,1) and achieving the minimum when   1.
We can easily obtain the results by analyzing the property of the function H().
Interestingly, the results in Proposition 5 are somewhat similar to those in the Proposition 6,
though the optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits for the supply chain  in the RS
market and the VN market are completely different. However, the profit differentials for the
supply  chain  under  the  two  supply  chain  power  structures are  similar.  Specifically,
9(ΠSC
NV−πSC
NV )=4 (ΠSC
RS−πSC
RS) .
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We next summarize the main results in Proposition 1, Proposition 3 and Proposition 5 in the
following Table 1.
  MS RS VN
b < a ≤ 2b Retailer Manufacturer Manufacturer
b < a ≤ 2b Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer
a > 2b Retailer Retailer Retailer
a > 2b Manufacturer Manufacturer Manufacturer
Table 1. Manufacturer vs. retailer operating the online channel in different power structures
From Table  1,  we  find  that  the  online  channel  operation  mode  is  affected  by  customers’
preference  for  the  online  channel,  the  self-price  elasticity  and  the  supply  chain  power
structures. When the self-price elasticity is large, the supply chain power structure has no
impact on the online channel model. Only customers’ preference for the online channel impacts
the supply chain’s optimal decision. When customers’ preference for the online channel is low,
it  is  better  for  the  retailer  to  operate  the  online  channel,  otherwise,  it  is  better  for  the
manufacturer to operate the online channel. However, when the self-price elasticity is small,
then  if  customers’  preference  for  the  online  channel  is  high,  then  it’s  better  for  the
manufacturer to operate the online channel, no matter what the supply chain power structure
is. However, when customers’ preference for the online channel is low, then in the MS market,
it is better for the retailer to operate the online channel,  while in the RS market and the VN
market, it is better for the manufacturer to operate the online channel.
The results in Table 1 imply that the two channel structures, RS and VN, have no direct impact
on  the  online  channel  operation  mode  choice.  However,  it  does  convey  some  important
messages.  When  the  retailers  are  more  powerful  or  equal  powerful  compared  with  the
manufacturers, most of the time the online channel should be operated by the manufacturers.
This  may  be  an  efficient  way  to  alleviate  the  double  marginalization  effect  caused  by
decentralized decisions. But this is not always the case, especially when the cross-price effect
is low and customers’ preference for the online channel is low. At this time, the retailer should
operate the online channel by herself. Therefore, when a manager plans to introduce the online
channel into the extant channel configuration, he should simultaneously consider three key
factors, customers’ preference for the online channel, the adverse impact of the online channel
on the demand of the traditional retail channel, as well as the supply chain power between the
retailer and the manufacturer. The retailer should be very cautious to open an online channel
and  operate  it  by  herself.  Because  in  most  cases,  the  operation  efficiency  of  the  retailer
operating the online channel mode is lower than that of the manufacturer operating the online
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channel mode. This is parallel with real business situations. Though some retailers have taken
on the online-to-offline channel strategy, however, in practice, most of the online channels are
operated by the manufacturers. The results in Table 1 may give an explanation why most of
the online channels are operated by the manufacturers. 
6. Concluding Remarks
The introduction of online channel can be beneficial to the supply chain, because it can reach
more customers, which cannot be achieved by the traditional single channel. Hence, more and
more supply chain systems have  been  introducing the online channels into their traditional
supply chain channel configurations. However, thought there is much literature on how to price
a dual-channel supply, how to coordinate the dual supply chain, as well as how to improve the
dual-channel supply chain with other performance-improving considerations,  the question on
which party should operate the online channel is not well addressed. In this paper, we address
the online channel operation mode decision, i.e., when considering opening an online electronic
channel,  which party should operate the online channel. We consider the problem from the
perspective of supply chain power structures. We consider three different supply chain power
structures, which are the manufacturer Stackelberg, the retailer Stackelberg and the vertical
Nash. By using the noncooperative game theory, we obtain the optimal pricing decisions and
optimal profits for the manufacturer, the retailer and the supply chain. We then compare the
supply chain’s total profits under different scenarios.
We  find  that  the  online  channel  operation  mode  is  significantly  affected  by  customers’
preference for the online channel and the self-price elasticity in different supply chain power
structures. When the self-price elasticity is very large, if customer’s preference for the online
channel is low, then it is better for the retailer to operate the online channel, otherwise, it is
better  for  the  manufacturer  to  operate  the  online  channel.  However,  when  the  self-price
elasticity is small, then if customers’ preference for the online channel is high, then it’s better
for the manufacturer to operate the online channel. However, when customers’ preference for
the online channel is low, then in the MS market, it is better for the retailer to operate the
online channel, while in the RS market and in the VN market, it is better for the manufacturer
to operate the online channel.
The contributions of the paper are two-fold. On the one hand, the results in this paper may
help  business  managers  to  make  proper  online  channel  operation  mode  decisions.  When
making decisions as for introducing an online channel, the decision-maker should take into
considerations the supply chain power structures, customers’ preference for the online channel
and  the  cross-price  elasticity.  Ignorance  of  one  of  these  factors  may  lead  to  suboptimal
decisions. On the other hand, the optimal pricing decisions are also presented in the paper, and
the supply parties’ optimal profits, as well as the total supply chain’s profit, are obtained. In
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practice, we find that there are some supply chains with the retailers operating the online
channel,  while  others  with  the  manufacturers  operating  the  online  channel,  however,  the
underlying reason is not yet very clear. The results of this paper may give some analytical
explanations to some extent. Admittedly, the results obtained in this paper are based on some
stylized  game  theoretical  models  which  only  capture  some  important  parameters  in  real
situations. In practice, as for which party should operate the online channel, there are some
other factors that must also be taken into consideration, such as the experience of channel
management, the investment of information infrastructure, and some specific properties of the
products, and so on. It seems more benefiting to incorporate these factors into the stylized
game theoretical modes, and sometimes this may leads to intractable models. Consequently,
we choose to focus on the impact of supply chain power structures on the online channel
operation mode choice.
Some extensions are possible to conduct based on this paper. First, the scenario of stochastic
demand can be incorporated into the current research framework. Second, the asymmetric
information about the market demand can also be considered, and some interesting results
may be obtained. Third, the risk attitude of the supply chain parties can be further considered.
These extensions are interesting work in the future.
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